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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brian Kenneth Taylor appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty pleas to four counts of sex abuse, four counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor, and one count of sexual exploitation of a child. Taylor 
contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and abused 
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Nine-year-old S.R. disclosed to her school psychologist, and later the 
police, that her neighbor, Brian Taylor, sexually abused her. (PSI, pp.3-4; PSI 
attachments, pp.8-12.) S.R. reported that on several occasions, Taylor removed 
her pants and underwear and touched her buttocks and vaginal area with his 
hands and mouth. (PSI, p.3; PSI attachments, pp.10-12.) S.R. told officers that 
Taylor recorded some of this abuse on a silver camera with a sliding cover, and 
that Taylor showed her photos of his abuse of both her and another child, R.R. 
(PSI, pp.3-4; PSI attachments, pp.10-12.) 
Later that day, officers contacted Taylor at his home. (State's Exhibit C, 
p.14. 1) Taylor acknowledged that S.R. often came to his residence to play with 
his son, but denied any inappropriate conduct. (State's Exhibit C, pp.14-18.) 
Eventually, officers informed Taylor of his Miranda2 rights and told him that they 
1 References to page numbers of exhibits refer to the page numbers located on 
the bottom right-hand corner of those exhibits, regardless of whether those 
numbers are in sequential order. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
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were going to "freeze the scene" and apply for a search warrant. (State's Exhibit 
C, p.18.) Taylor declined to speak with the officers further. (Id.) 
Officers then sought and obtained a warrant to search Taylor's residence 
for evidence relating to the production and storage of child pornography, 
including computers, hard drives, cameras, memory cards, videos, photos, etc.; 
evidence of correspondence between Taylor and S.R.; evidence of sexual 
activity; and indicia of ownership of the seized evidence. (PSI, p.4; R., Vol. I, 
pp.90-91.) 
Upon execution of the warrant, officers seized a cell phone that contained 
a photo of the vaginal area of pre-pubescent female, as well as a computer, a 
camera, and several compact flash storage cards. (State's Exhibit B, pp.251-
252.) Officers also seized a small bindle containing methamphetamine, and 
various paraphernalia commonly associated with smoking methamphetamine. 
(State's Exhibit B, p.252.) Officers found, but did not seize, large amounts of 
adult pornography and sexual aids and toys. (State's Exhibit A, p.26.) Officers 
did not locate the camera described by S.R. (State's Exhibit B, pp.251-252.) 
Taylor was not arrested at this time. 
In a subsequent interview, S.R. disclosed that Taylor had showed her 
pornography and had abused her with various sex toys. (PSI, p.5; R., Vol. I, 
pp.41-43.) Based upon this information, and the fact that officers had not yet 
recovered the camera described by S.R., officers applied for and obtained a 
second warrant authorizing them to search for and seize: 
• "Evidence of sexual activity including, without limitation, 
sexual devices, lubricants, condoms, and items that may 
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contain bodily fluids associated with sexual activity. 
• Images of adult pornography contained in magazines, DVD, 
and VHS format; 
• Camera-capable devices; 
• lndicia of residency in, or ownership or possession of, the 
premises and any of the above items." 
(R., Vol. I, pp.41-43, 80-81; State's Exhibit C, p.39.) 
Approximately twenty days after they executed the first warrant, officers 
returned to the home to execute the second warrant. (State's Exhibit A, p.33.) 
Taylor voluntarily returned home from his place of employment and let the officers 
into the residence. (Id.) Officers seized numerous sex toys, including one 
previously described by S.R., pornographic videos and magazines, and a manual 
for a camera consistent with the one described by S.R. (State's Exhibit A, pp.33-
36.) 
Officers then read Taylor his Miranda rights, and questioned him about the 
location of the camera depicted in the manual and described by S.R. (State's 
Exhibit A, p.34; Defendant's Exhibit A, p.2.) Detective Bill Shields told Taylor that 
officers would be there "all night" and would "tear that room apart from one 
square inch to the other" to find the camera. (Defendant's Exhibit A, p.2.) Taylor 
then told the officers the location of the camera, and the officers seized it. 
(State's Exhibit A, p.34.) Detective Shields examined the camera and noted that 
its memory card had been removed. (State's Exhibit B, pp.289-290.) Detective 
Shields also noted that the camera was an older model that utilized a now-
obsolete XO style of memory card. (Id.) 
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Officers questioned Taylor about the location of the missing memory card. 
(Id.) Though initially reluctant to reveal this information, Taylor eventually did so 
after the officers told him that by refusing to comply, Taylor ran of the risk of 
further victimizing S.R., should any explicit photos of her get out into the public. 
(State's Exhibit A, p.34; State's Exhibit C, pp.40-41; Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.7-
23) The officers recovered two XO memory cards where Taylor said they would 
be, inside a bag of rice in the kitchen. (State's Exhibit A, p.34.) After verifying 
that the memory cards fit the camera previously seized, officers seized the cards. 
(State's Exhibit A, p.34; State's Exhibit B, pp.289-290.) 
Officers returned to the police station to examine the contents of the XO 
memory cards. (State's Exhibit B, pp.290-291.) The cards contained more than 
200 photos, nearly all of which depicted Taylor sexually abusing S.R., R.R., and 
M.N., Taylor's five-year-old son. (PSI attachments, pp.297-298; State's Exhibit C, 
pp.42-44.) Officers then arrested Taylor. (State's Exhibit B, p.291.) Officers later 
identified a fourth victim, R.R.'s brother Z.R. (PSI, pp.5-6.) In subsequent 
interviews, R.R., Z.R., and M.N. all disclosed that Taylor had sexually abused 
them. (PSI, pp.5-6; PSI attachments pp.343-394.) 
The state ultimately charged Taylor with seven counts of sex abuse, seven 
counts of lewd conduct with a minor, seven counts of male rape, two counts of 
sexual exploitation of a child, and single counts of rape and possession of 
methamphetamine. (R., Vol. I, pp.163-173.) 
Taylor moved to suppress his statements made during the officers' 
execution of the second search warrant, and all evidence subsequently seized 
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under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. (R., Vol. II, pp.179-218.) Taylor 
argued: (1) the officers executing the second search warrant violated Taylor's 
Miranda rights by attempting to interrogate him after Taylor had previously 
asserted his right to remain silent several weeks earlier; and (2) even if the 
Miranda rights given during the execution of the second search warrant were 
effective, Taylor's statements and the evidence subsequently seized should still 
be suppressed because the statements were coerced and involuntary. (Id.) After 
a hearing at which a transcript of the interrogation and affidavits from the officers 
were admitted as exhibits (10/10/13 Tr., p.4, L.9 - p.33, L.3), the district court 
denied the motion, concluding that the officers did not violate Taylor's Miranda 
rights, and that Taylor's statements made during the execution of the second 
search warrant were voluntary and not coerced (R., Vol. II, pp.271-280). 
The state and Taylor then entered into a conditional plea agreement in 
which Taylor preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion 
to suppress, and to withdraw his pleas should he be successful on appeal. (R., 
Vol. 11, pp.281-283.) Pursuant to that agreement, Taylor pied guilty to four counts 
of sex abuse, four counts of lewd conduct with a minor, and one count of sexual 
exploitation of a child. (Id.; 11/13/13 Tr., p.7, L.12 - p.25, L.5.) There was no 
agreement with regard to the parties' sentencing recommendations. (R., Vol. II, 
pp.281-233; 11/13/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-21.) 
The district court imposed concurrent unified life sentences, with ten years 
fixed, for each charge of lewd conduct with a minor; a consecutive five years 
fixed for sexual exploitation of a child; and 10 years fixed for each charge of sex 
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abuse, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other 
charges. (R., Vol. II, pp.336-342; 2/4/14 Tr., p.83, L.22 - p.94, L.16.) This 
resulted in a cumulative unified life sentence with 25 years fixed. Taylor timely 
appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp.343-346.) 
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ISSUES 
Taylor states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Taylor's motion to 
suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing upon 
Mr. Taylor a total unified sentence of life, with 25 years fixed, 
in light of the mitigating information? 
(Appellant's brief, p.10) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Taylor failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? 





Taylor Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Suppress 
A Introduction 
Taylor contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress statements he made during the execution of the second search 
warrant, as well as evidence subsequently seized, pursuant to the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-15.) Specifically, Taylor argues 
that that the district court erred in concluding that his statements were voluntary 
and not coerced. (Id.) A review of the record reveals that the officers' 
interrogation techniques, while persuasive, did not constitute unconstitutional 
coercion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). Thus, where an 
appellant claims his statements were involuntary, this Court gives "deference to 
the lower court's findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages 
in "free review over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally 
sufficient to show voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 
159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal 
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question freely reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,287 (1991). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Taylor's Statements Were 
Voluntary 
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
Indeed, "coercive government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme] 
Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi," 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and 
"the cases considered by th[e] Court" post-Brown "have focused upon the crucial 
element of police overreaching." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-164. "While each 
confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that 
police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of 
coercive police conduct." kl at 164. "Absent police conduct causally related to 
the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has 
deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." kL,; see also State v. 
Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) ("In order to 
find a violation of a defendant's due process rights by virtue of an involuntary 
confession, coercive police conduct is necessary."). 
"The proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and then 
ask whether the defendant's will was overborne by the police conduct." State v. 
Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 953, 303 P.3d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 
P.2d 750, 753 (1993)). Relevant factors to consider in determining whether a 
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defendant's statements are voluntary include whether Miranda warnings were 
given, the defendant's age, education, and intelligence, the length of detention, 
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical 
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Stone, 154 
Idaho at 953, 303 P.3d at 640 (Idaho Court of Appeals utilizing the Bustamante 
factors). Importantly, the absence or presence of any one factor is not 
determinative. .lit 
The exclusionary rule calls for suppression of evidence that is gained 
through unconstitutional governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796, 815 (1984); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125 P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. 
App. 2005). This prohibition against the use of derivative evidence extends to 
the indirect as well as the direct fruit of the government's misconduct. Segura, 
468 U.S. at 804; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). 
Nevertheless, "[s]uppression is not justified unless 'the challenged evidence is in 
some sense the product of illegal governmental activity." Segura, 468 U.S. at 
815 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)). That is, 
"evidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' 
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cause of the discovery of the evidence." l.9.:.3 
In this case, the district court denied Taylor's motion to suppress, 
concluding that his statements made during the execution of the second search 
warrant were voluntary and not coerced. (R., Vol. II, pp.271-280.) Specifically, 
the court concluded: (1) application of the relevant Bustamante factors indicated 
that the interrogation was not unconstitutionally coercive; (2) a review of the 
totality of the circumstances further demonstrated that Taylor's statements were 
voluntary; and (3) the officers' "threats" to search the home if Taylor did not 
cooperate were supported by the search warrant, which authorized the officers to 
conduct such a search.4 (Id.) A review of the record and of the applicable law 
supports the district court's rulings Specifically: the officers' interrogation 
techniques, while persuasive, did not render Taylor's statements involuntary 
pursuant to the relevant Bustamante factors and a totality of the circumstances 
analysis; and the second search warrant authorized the officers to search for and 
seize both the camera and the memory cards, and even if it did not, any contrary 
implication made by the officers to Taylor did not render Taylor's statements 
3 Because it denied Taylor's motion to suppress statements made during the 
execution of the second search warrant, the district court did not address Taylor's 
argument that the physical evidence subsequently seized by officers should be 
suppressed pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Should this 
Court find that the district court erred in denying Taylor's motion to suppress his 
statements, it should remand the case for a determination of whether and which 
portions of the seized physical evidence should also be suppressed. Such a 
determination may require additional findings of fact, such as whether any of the 
seized evidence may be subject to the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
4 On appeal, Taylor does not challenge the district court's conclusion that he 
failed to show that the officers violated his Miranda rights. (Appellant's brief, p.8, 
n. 5, 6.) 
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involuntary. 
1. Application Of The Bustamante Factors And An Analysis Of The 
Totality Of The Circumstances Supports the District Court's 
Determination 
The district court applied the Bustamante factors discussed above and 
properly concluded that they did not support Taylor's assertion that his 
statements were involuntary. (R., Vol. II, pp.277-278.) As the district court 
concluded: (1) officers informed Taylor of his Miranda rights before any 
questioning occurred, and it was apparent from Taylor's previous invocation of his 
right to remain silent during the execution of the first search warrant that he 
understood this right and how to exercise it; (2) Taylor is an adult; (3) there was 
no evidence in the record that Taylor was uneducated or unintelligent, and in fact, 
as the state pointed out (R., Vol. II, p.263), Taylor's dialogue with officers, as 
exhibited by the transcript of the interrogation, demonstrated that he was not an 
individual of low intelligence; (4) there was no evidence in the record that the 
detention was of any significant length or that the questioning was repetitive or 
prolonged, or that Taylor was deprived of sleep or food (R., Vol. II, pp.278-279). 
Indeed, while the exact length of the interrogation cannot be ascertained from the 
transcript (see Defendant's Exhibit A), it is clear that it was not particularly lengthy 
or onerously repetitive. On appeal, Taylor does not take issue with the district 
court's application of the Bustamante factors, or challenge any of the factual 
determinations inherent in that application. 
A broader review of the totality of the circumstances further supports the 
district court's determination. While the district court concluded that Taylor was 
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"in custody" for purposes of Miranda, there is no indication in the record that he 
was in handcuffs or subject to any show of force. The officers' strategy in 
interrogating Taylor was several-fold. With regard to his interrogation of Taylor 
about the location of the camera, Detective Shields told Taylor that cooperating 
would allow things to "go a lot faster," and that otherwise, Detective Shields 
would "be back there all night" and "tear that room apart from one square inch to 
the other" to find the camera. (Defendant's Exhibit A, pp.2-3.) With regard to his 
interrogation of Taylor about the location of the XD memory card, Detective 
Green: (1) expressed a concern that if the memory card was not located, the 
photos could get "beyond [Taylor's] control" and onto the internet, which would 
further victimize S.R.; (2) provided vague assurances that cooperation would be 
beneficial for Taylor; (3) verbally sympathized with Taylor and the situation he 
faced, and attempted to relate to him as "one man to another man"; and (4) 
validated Taylor's "legitimate addiction" to pornography and encouraged him to 
take responsibility for his actions and to seek treatment. (Defendant's Exhibit A, 
pp.5-24.) 
These interrogation strategies, while persuasive and effective in this case, 
were not so overbearing as to render Taylor's statements involuntary. In State v. 
Stone, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed similar police tactics, including 
"vague assurances of leniency," the "false friend" technique, and minimization, 
and found that such strategies did not render Stone's confessions involuntary, 
even where Stone was questioned over an eight-hour period, and even in light of 
expert testimony indicating that Stone was "suggestible and socially anxious." 
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Stone, 154 Idaho at 952-960, 303 P.3d at 639-647. 
While Detective Shields' statement to Taylor that he would "tear apart" the 
room if Taylor did not cooperate could contribute to and support a finding of 
coercion in some circumstances, it does not do so in this case in the absence of 
other factors strongly indicating coercion. This is particularly true, where, as 
here, and as discussed below, the search warrant expressly authorized Detective 
Shields to search Taylor's residence for the camera. (R., Vol. I, pp.80-81.) 
Detective Shields' comment was clearly not a literal threat to damage Taylor's 
property, but was more a promise to thoroughly search every "square inch" of the 
room for the camera, as long as it took. In the similar context of voluntary 
consent, numerous cases have held that such promises are not determinative of 
the question of voluntariness. See ~ United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 
25 (1 st Cir. 1991) (affirming district court finding that the officers' threat to "tear the 
place apart" amounted to "no more than a permissible promise to search the 
house thoroughly"), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 
U.S. 137 (1995); Holtzen v. United States, 694 F.2d 1129, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(consent to search voluntary even where officers claimed to have warrant, and 
threatened to "tear apart" defendant's house); United States v. Green, 678 F.2d 
81, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1982) (consent to search voluntary where officers threatened 
to "tear the house apart" if occupant did not turn over contraband); U.S. v. 
Medina, 2011 WL 887752, *9 (E.D. Wis. March 11, 2011) (agent's statement that 
house would likely be torn up if occupant failed to consent to a search did not 
deprive occupant of the ability to make a rational decision). 
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Because the officers engaged in legitimate interrogation strategies which 
did not unconstitutionally coerce Taylor into making involuntary statements, Taylor 
cannot show error in the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
2. The Second Search Warrant Authorized Officers To Search For And 
Seize The Memory Cards That Taylor Removed From His Camera 
A warrant under the Fourth Amendment must "particularly describ[e] the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. 
Amend. 4. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to "insur[e] against the 
search of premises where probable cause is lacking" and to "minimize the risk 
that officers executing search warrants will mistakenly search a place other than 
the one intended by the magistrate." State v. Harper, 152 Idaho 93, 102, 266 
P.3d 1198, 1207 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "A search pursuant to a warrant will exceed the 
scope authorized if officers seize property not specifically described in the 
warrant ... or officers search a location not specifically described or authorized." 
State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985, 989, 188 P.3d 927, 931 (Ct. App. 2008). 
While the language of a search warrant controls its scope, "[s]earch 
warrants must be read in a common sense way," Steele v. United States, 267 
U.S. 498, 503-04 (1925), and "the question whether the evidence seized falls 
within the scope of the warrant ultimately turns on the substance of the item 
seized 'and not the label assigned to it by the defendant."' United States v. Hill, 
19 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 661 (6th 
Cir. 1986)). An officer executing a search warrant must interpret the warrant's 
terms reasonably, but the officer need not give them the narrowest possible 
reasonable interpretation. See U.S. v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Idaho appellate courts have long recognized that "bowing to events, even 
if one is not happy about them, is not equivalent to being coerced." State v. 
Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 152 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that though 
Garcia was faced with two unpleasant choices - consenting to a search of his 
truck or the officers fulfilling their lawful threat to arrest Garcia and his friends -
this did not on its own establish police coercion); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 
708-709, 963 P.2d 387, 391-392 (Ct. App. 1998) (police threat to obtain and 
execute search warrant if Abeyta did not consent to search did not necessarily 
constitute police coercion); see also United States v. Agosto 502 F.2d 612, 614 
(9th Cir. 1974) (statement of officer's intention to obtain search warrant if consent 
was not given did not render consent per se involuntary). 
In this case, Taylor challenges the district court's conclusion that Detective 
Shields' "threat" to search the residence was backed by the authority to do so 
pursuant to the search warrant.5 Specifically, Taylor contends that while the 
second search warrant authorized officers to seize "camera-capable devices," it 
did not authorize them to search for and seize the memory cards. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.14-15.) Taylor's contention fails for several reasons. First, Detective 
5 As Taylor acknowledges (Appellant's brief, p.14, n.7), he did not argue below 
that the second search warrant lacked particularity, was overboard, or that the 
seizure of the memory card violated his 4th amendment rights. (See R., Vol. II, 
pp.179-190.) Therefore, on appeal, such questions are only relevant to the 
extent this Court reviews the district court's conclusion that the warrant 
authorized the search and seizure of the memory card. Regardless, this 
question is not determinative to the ultimate issue on appeal, whether Taylor's 
statements were voluntary. The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a 
legal question freely reviewed by an appellate court, and a proper inquiry 
involves a totality of the circumstances analysis. See Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 303 
P.3d 636. 
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Shields' "threat" to search the residence related directly to the portion of the 
interrogation in which officers sought the location of the camera, not the memory 
card. Second, the XD memory card later sought by the officers was a part of the 
"camera-capable device" they previously seized. Further, even if the second 
search warrant did not authorize officers to search for and seize the memory 
cards, this did not render Taylor's statements involuntary. 
A review of the transcript of the interrogation reveals two distinct portions -
one relating to the officers' search for the camera, and one relating to the officers' 
search for the memory card. (See generally Defendant's Exhibit A.) Only in the 
first portion did Detective Shields "threaten" Taylor with a thorough search of his 
residence. (Id.) The second search warrant expressly authorized the officers to 
search for and seize the camera. (R., Vol. I, pp.80-81.) Therefore, Detective 
Shields had lawful authority to search Taylor's residence for the camera when he 
made the "threat" to do so. 
Next, the search warrant authorized the officers to search for and seize 
the memory card because it was a part of the camera they had previously seized 
pursuant to the warrant. When Detective Shields located the camera, he noticed 
that the memory card had been removed. (State's Exhibit B, pp.289-290.) It was 
only then that the officers began to search for the missing cards. Upon locating 
the cards (which were of an obsolete style only compatible with certain older 
cameras, including the camera previously seized by officers), Detective Shields 
confirmed that they fit into the camera before seizing them. (State's Exhibit B, 
p.290.) Even if the memory cards were not expressly referenced in the second 
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search warrant, these particular XO cards were part of the camera that was so 
referenced. Additionally, these particular memory cards were themselves 
"camera-capable devices," because they were utilized by this camera to store 
photos. The officers could thus reasonably interpret the term of the warrant 
giving them the authority to search for and seize "camera-capable devices" as 
permitting them to seize the memory cards. 
Finally, even if the district court erred in concluding that the second search 
warrant authorized the search and seizure of the memory cards, Detective 
Shields' "threat" to search the residence still did not render Taylor's statements 
involuntary in light of the absence of coercive tactics, as discussed above. 
Even "deceptive police practices"6 do not necessarily create coercion which 
would render a suspect's subsequent confession involuntary and excludable." 
State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 892 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State 
v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 515-518, 37 P.3d 6, 12-15 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that officer's statement to suspect, which falsely implied that police 
already were in possession of a warrant to search defendant's barn, was not 
impermissible or coercive, in contrast with a circumstance where police actually 
misrepresent that they possess a warrant in order to obtain consent to enter or 
search premises). In the present case, Detective Shields did not actually tell 
Taylor that he had a search warrant to seize the memory cards. 
6 There is no indication that Detective Shields actually attempted to deceive 
Taylor about his authority to seize the memory card when he "threatened" to 
search Taylor's residence for the camera. As discussed above, Detective Shields 
did not even know that the memory card had been removed from the camera at 
the time he interrogated Taylor and made this "threat." 
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The district court considered the totality of the circumstances and properly 
concluded that Taylor's statements to police were voluntary and not coerced. 
Taylor has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress. 
11. 
Taylor Has Failed To Show That The District Court Imposed An Excessive 
Sentence 
A Introduction 
Taylor asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Taylor has failed to establish 
that his sentence is excessive considering the objectives of sentencing and the 
nature of Taylor's crimes. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. ~ 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the 
sentence is excessive, Taylor must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
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protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 1st 
In this case, prior to imposing its sentence, the district court reviewed the 
presentence investigation report, Taylor's asserted corrections to that report, a 
psychosexual evaluation, Taylor's sentencing memorandum, and the exhibits 
submitted by the parties, which included the photos seized by the officers. 
(2/4/14 Tr., p.66, L.21 - p.67, L.3; p.83, L.22 - p.84, L.9.) The court also 
expressly referenced the relevant sentencing factors. 7 (2/4/14 Tr., p.87, L.11 -
p.89, L.24.) A review of the record supports the district court's sentencing 
determination. 
Taylor's crimes were egregious. At the sentencing hearing, Detective 
Shields, the Internet Crimes Against Children officer for the Moscow Police 
Department, who examined and cataloged much of the seized evidence, 
described the photos depicting the sexual abuse perpetrated by Taylor as the 
"[w]orst photos I have ever seen in my life." (2/4/14 Tr., p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.23.) 
These photos depicted various manners of sexual abuse inflicted upon all four 
known minor victims. See PSI attachments, pp.301-335 (detailed descriptions of 
7 In considering the fixed life sentence recommended by the state, the district 
court expressed a belief that such a sentence required a finding that Taylor was 
"not capable of being rehabilitated and that the only means of protecting society 
is by the imposition of a fixed life sentence." (Tr., p.86, Ls.4-11.) The court 
indicated that it did not impose a fixed life sentence in this case only because 
"the record is not devoid of any possibility of you being someone who can be 
treated at some point." (Tr., p.86, Ls.8-22.) However, in State v. Windom, 150 
Idaho 873, 867, 253 P.3d 310, 313 (2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected 
Windom's argument that the nature of an offense standing alone could not 
support a fixed life sentence, and reiterated that in appropriate cases, a district 
court may impose a determinate life sentence based upon the egregiousness of 
the crime. Though the district court apparently misperceived the scope of its 
sentencing discretion in this case, the state has not challenged its sentencing 
determination. 
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the seized photos.) Taylor took advantage of trust placed in him by friends and 
neighbors to access those individuals' children for sexual purposes. (See 2/4/14 
Tr., p.54, Ls.12-17; p.60, Ls.6-8.) 
Taylor has failed to take full responsibility for his crimes or to fully 
acknowledge their severity. Taylor told the presentence investigator that he got 
"a little-touch - feely" with S.R. when he drank, and that if S.R. was ever 
uncomfortable, "she would have quit corning over all the time." (PSI, p.9.) While 
acknowledging inappropriate conduct, Taylor denied that he had "ever physically 
or sexually assaulted" someone else, explaining that "[a]ssault indicates violence 
or threats." (PSI, p.25.) Taylor also asserted that if he had an "adult companion 
in the picture, whether present or not," he would not have "drifted that way." (PSI, 
p.9.) 
The record further indicates that Taylor has a history of abusing children 
beyond the four victims in the present case. In 2012, another minor, M.R., 
disclosed to authorities that Taylor had touched her inappropriately. (PSI, p.4; 
PSI attachments, pp.150-156.) No criminal charges were pursued at that time 
due to lack of corroborating evidence. (PSI, p.4; PSI attachments, p.156.) In 
2001, Taylor was charged with felony child molestation in Iowa. (PSI, p.10.) 
According to the contemporaneous police reports, two children Taylor was 
watching walked in on him using a "pocket pussy" sex toy. (PSI attachments, 
pp.169-229.) Taylor gave the children the sex toy and told them they could try it 
themselves. (Id.) The boys did so, and then returned it Taylor, who used it again 
while the children were leaving the room. (Id.) It was unclear to the presentence 
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investigator what the final disposition of this charge was, but Taylor reported he 
was convicted of an amended charge of assault. (PSI, pp.12-13.) Taylor was 
also previously charged with injury to child after methamphetamine was found in 
a room his son had access to. (PSI, p.13.) This charge was dismissed after 
Taylor pied guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia. (Id.) 
Taylor's psychosexual evaluation also supports the district court's 
sentencing determination. The combined Static-99r/Stable-2007 assessment 
placed Taylor's risk of sexual recidivism in the "High" range - the 84th to the 94th 
percentile. (Psychosexual evaluation, pp.1, 18.) Taylor's performance on the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial lnventory-3 revealed a profile consistent with "an 
indifference to the welfare of others," and "a tendency to charm and exploit 
others and to extract special recognition without consideration of reciprocal 
responsibility." (Psychosexual evaluation, p.12.) His answers on the MSl-11 
demonstrated that he "rationalizes to minimize the seriousness of his sexual 
behavior." (Psychosexual evaluation, p.15.) Though Taylor appears to be 
amenable to treatment (Psychosexual evaluation pp.19-21 ), the evaluator 
recognized several risk factors, including Taylor's indifference to the welfare of 
others, inability to maintain appropriate intimate relationships, a demonstrated 
pattern of sexual preoccupation, and a sexual arousal to prepubescent children 
(Psychosexual evaluation pp.21-22). 
In the course of the presentence investigation and at the sentencing 
hearing, family members of the victims described the impact of Taylor's crimes. 
(PSI, pp.6-8; 2/4/14 Tr., p.53, L.4 - p.61, L.2.) S.R.'s parents described the 
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emotional burdens and turmoil Taylor's abuse caused within their family, and the 
negative impact of the abuse on S.R.'s social interactions with others. (PSI, 
pp.6-8; 2/4/14 Tr., p.53, L.15 - p.55, L.13.) The mother of Z.R. and R.R. reported 
that both of her children were in counseling and that Z.R. was diagnosed with 
PTSD. (PSI, p.8; 2/4/14 Tr., p.59, L.18 - p.61, L.2.) M.N.'s mother reported that 
M.N. began having behavioral problems following the abuse and was in 
counseling. (PSI, p.8; 2/4/14 Tr., p.55, L.18 - p.59, L.17.) 
The imposed unified life sentence with 25 years fixed was entirely 
reasonable in light of the nature of Taylor's crimes and other factors evident in the 
record. Taylor has therefore failed to show that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Taylor's convictions 
and the district court's denial of Taylor's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2014. 
t?l--e__ c;._ ~ 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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